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1.  Introduction 
 This paper considers some issues in the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy 
since the financial crisis of 1997-8.  My title is different than the one suggested by the Banks 
research planning and coordination team, which was Six Years of Free Floating in Korea.  My 
alternative does not prejudge the question of how to characterize Koreas monetary and 
exchange rate policy since the crisis.  National officials will say that the Bank of Korea has 
pursued inflation targeting and that the exchange rate has not been an intermediate target nor 
even contained much useful information for forecasting economic trends.  The Bank of Korea 
has adopted much of the apparatus of inflation targeting, complete with a band for target 
inflation and a Monetary Policy Report to the National Assembly.  The 2004 version, the most 
recent edition available at the time of writing, stipulates an annual target of 3 per cent plus or 
minus 1 per cent, along with a medium-term (longer than one year) inflation target of 2.5-3.5 per 
cent; it makes little mention of the exchange rate.  Trends in the dollar/won exchange rate are 
                                                 
1 Prepared for a symposium at the Bank of Korea, 25 August 2004.  I thank Raul Garcia for exceptionally able 
research assistance and discussions, and Seung-Cheol Jeon, Jung Sik Kim, Junggun Oh, and Ramkishen Rajan for 
helpful comments. 
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mentioned in passing on p.8, but no implications are drawn for the conduct of monetary policy.2  
From this it would appear that the exchange rate plays little role in monetary policy in Korea.3 
 It would be surprising were this the case, for in an economy as open and sensitive to 
foreign trade and investment as Korea, movements in the exchange rate should contain valuable 
information useful for forecasting movements in inflation and the output gap, the two arguments 
of the standard objective function of a central bank that engages in flexible inflation targeting.  
Movements in the exchange rate determine movements in import prices, which are passed 
through into the prices of domestic substitutes and thereby affect the prospects for inflation.  
Movements in the exchange rate may also affect the short-to-medium-term evolution of the 
output gap, whether through changes in competitiveness (owing to incomplete passthrough) or 
balance-sheet effects (if a countrys external assets and liabilities are dollarized).  They may have 
implications for other valid concerns of the central bank, such as the stability of the financial 
system.  Hence, even if the central bank does not attach utility to the exchange rate itself (even if 
the value of the currency is not itself an argument of the authorities objective function), the 
exchange rate can still be an important intermediate target for monetary policy.  This in fact is 
the unanimous conclusion of recent analytical work on the conduct of inflation targeting in open 
economies.4 
                                                 
2 There is then a brief Chapter 5, entitled Foreign Exchange Markets, again with a one-page review of trends in 
the dollar/won exchange rate in 2003, but no analysis of the implications for monetary policy.  Equally revealingly, 
the first time the words exchange rate appear in Bank of Korea (2003) is some one hundred pages into this 
document, and then only in the context of a retrospective discussion of monetary and financial experience.  The 
most revealing passage in this document is hidden on p.123, where it is written that the Bank of Korea is obliged to 
change its monetary policy stance when the exchange rate is not in balance with the inflation target. 
3 The Bank of Koreas Quarterly Bulletin for the first quarter of 2004 (the latest available at the time of writing) 
does mention in the depreciation of the exchange rate in the context of import price inflation as early as p.l6, 
although it then does not refer further to the exchange rate in describing the formulation of monetary policy.  See 
Bank of Korea (2004b). 
4 See Ball (1999), Eichengreen (2002) and Truman (2003). 
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 In addition, there is the conclusion of authors like McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) that 
when exchange rate changes are measured at high frequencies the day-to-day volatility of the 
dollar exchange rates of the principal East Asian countries, including Korea, is not significantly 
greater than before the crisis.  Other authors have reached different conclusions: Oh (2004a) 
similarly computes various measures of exchange rate volatility before and after the crisis (the 
percentage change in the absolute value of the end of day price between successive days, the 
difference between the highest and lowest price during the day as a percentage of the intra-daily 
average exchange rate) and finds more than a doubling of both measures between 1 March 1995-
31 October 1997 and 1 April 1998-30 September 2003.5  The same conclusion comes through 
even more strongly in Eichengreen (2003), when the standard deviation of the exchange rate is 
normalized by the standard deviation of reserves.  Be this as it may, a number of authors have 
expressed surprise that the won exchange rate has not displayed more variability at high 
frequencies in the last six years. 
 Finally, McKinnon and Schnabl regress the exchange rate of the won against the 
exchange rates of the dollar, the yen and the deutschmark (where all exchange rate rates are 
measured vis-à-vis the Swiss franc and expressed as log differences).  They find that the U.S. 
dollar has been the dominant currency in the authorities implicit target basket both before and 
after the crisis and infer from this that the Bank of Korea continues to severely limit short-run 
fluctuations in the dollar rate.6  Some Korean commentators will observe that the country was 
officially floating before the crisis as well, but the reality then was that the Korean authorities 
attached considerable importance to the dollar exchange rate.  They actively managed the dollar 
                                                 
5 Excluding the crisis period 1 November 1997-31 March 1998. 
6 There is some evidence of an increasing weight on the yen in the Korean basket, but the dollar still remains far-
and-away dominant, according to their results.  Oh (2004b) similarly finds that the  won maintains its correlation 
with the dollar while displaying an increasing correlation with the yen. 
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rate to the point where some observers referred to an implicit dollar peg or band.  Thus, pre-crisis 
experience is not obviously a challenge to McKinnon and Schnabls conclusion that the Korean 
authorities continue to heavily manage the dollar rates  that even if fluctuations in the won-
dollar exchange rate seem to be permitted in the medium run, the Bank of Korea adjusts policy to 
rather strictly limit the currencys fluctuation in the short run. 
  In this paper I ask what is the most accurate way of characterizing the conduct of 
monetary and exchange rate policy in Korea.  Is the Bank of Korea accurately characterized as a 
flexible inflation targeter?7  Does it use its monetary policy instrument  the overnight call rate  
to target inflation and other variables potentially of concern (the output gap, the stability of the 
financial system) to while allowing the exchange rate to passively adjust to that interest rate 
setting, which is what would seem to be suggested by the Monetary Policy Report?  Or does it 
attach independent importance to the exchange rate and modify its monetary policy stance when 
a putative setting for the overnight call right implies an uncomfortably large change in the 
exchange rate?  
My answer to the first question is yes: a standard Taylor-type inflation targeting rule 
turns to be to a useful way of characterizing the Bank of Koreas policy.  At the same time, 
movements in the exchange rate are too important for the objectives of central bank policy to 
effectively be disregarded, as they are in large, less open de facto inflation targeters like the 
United States.  It is not surprising in this light that my analysis in fact suggests that when setting 
the overnight call rate the Bank of Korea responds to not just expected inflation and the output 
gap but also to movements in the won/dollar exchange rate.  I thus prefer to think of its monetary 
                                                 
7 The distinction between flexible inflation targeting and the alternative (strict inflation targeting) is that under the 
former the authorities attach weight not only to deviation in inflation from its target but also to short-run fluctuations 
in the output gap, over which they have limited control. 
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regime not as a free float backed by inflation targeting but as a managed float accompanied by 
modified inflation targeting. 
 Having provided a characterization of Korean monetary policy as open-economy 
inflation targeting with special attention to movements in the real exchange rate, I next consider 
some special topics that arise in the Korean context.  I ask whether this controversy over the role 
that the exchange rate has actually played in the conduct of monetary policy suggests that 
Korean policy has been insufficiently transparent.  In addition, previously authors (like 
McKinnon and Schnabl) having asked whether Korea has to follow the United States, Japan and 
Euroland when formulating its monetary and exchange rate policies, I inquire into the 
implications of the emergence of China.  Finally, I ask how the development of the Korean 
economy and its financial markets should influence the conduct of monetary and exchange rate 
policies going forward.  
  
2.  Monetary Policy in Korea 
 The revision of the Bank of Korea Act that came into effect in April 1998 identifies price 
stability as the primary objective of monetary policy.  It specifies that the central bank should set 
an annual inflation target and strive to achieve it.  These arrangements superseded a system in 
which monetary indicators were the intermediate targets of policy (first M1, then the central 
banks net domestic assets, then reserve money, then domestic credit of financial institutions, net 
domestic credit, again M1, M2, M2 plus certificates of deposit and balances held by investment 
trust companies, and finally M3  it is hard to imagine a clearer illustration of the operation of 
Goodharts law).  The 1998 act then stipulated that the central bank should set an inflation target 
in consultation with the government and make that target public.   
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Initially, the target was framed in terms of the consumer price index; in 2000, after 
further study, this was changed to core inflation.  For a time the Bank of Korea continued to set 
targets for M3 as well as inflation, on the grounds that financial markets could have been 
thrown into confusion if the monetary targeting that had been utilized during the past 30 years 
were to be scrapped all at once.8  From 2001, M3 was dropped as an intermediate target.9  
Policy decisions are delegated to an independent Monetary Policy Committee.10  Consistent with 
modern theories of inflation targeting, the Bank of Korea began announcing its monetary policy 
decisions immediately, communicating its general intentions to the public, and submitting an 
annual report on monetary policy to the National Assembly. 
 The central banks operating variable is the overnight call rate, the target for which can 
be raised or lowered on a monthly basis in response to fluctuations in expected inflation and 
other variables.  The actual overnight rate fluctuates around the target call rate as a function of 
open market transactions in repos or monetary stabilization bonds (Figure 1).  Other market rates 
move broadly in line with the overnight rate (Figure 2).  The Bank of Koreas most recent report 
to the National Assembly suggests that it engages in flexible inflation targeting, in that it 
moderates the speed at which it adjusts the call rate in response to deviations between actual and 
target inflation with the condition of the real economy in mind.  Although the central banks 
fundamental task is clearly that of ensuring price stability, that does not mean that it can ignore 
other policy goals.  Even if future price increases are expected to be high, provided they remain 
                                                 
8 Bank of Korea (2003), pp.17-18.  In this respect its approach resembled the two pillar strategy of the early ECB.  
Thus, initially the Monetary Policy Committee decided on the basic direction of open market operations with 
reference to the movement of the monetary aggregates. 
9 M3 was subsequently used as an information variable only. 
10 Independence was buttressed by the revised Bank of Korea Act that came into effect in 1998, which made the 
Governor of the Bank rather than the Minister of Finance and Economics the chairman of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, limited to one the number of members that was appointed by the government, and removed provisions 
that might have been invoked by the government in order to force board members to resign. 
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within the target range, the central bank may not need to raise interest rates, basing its decision 
rather on the state of the financial markets or the real economy.11 
 One way of inferring how important inflation, the real economy and the exchange rate 
have been in the policy decisions of the Bank of Korea is to estimate an extended Taylor Rule.12  
Assume that the call rate partially adjusts to the target according to the function: 
    rt=(1-D)rt* + -Drt-1 + Lt    (1) 
where r is the call rate, r* is the target for the call rate, and L is a random shock that is assumed 
to be i.i.d.13  The coefficient D0*[0,1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing practiced by 
the central bank.  
 Assume now that: 
 rt*=rtlr + $ (E[ Bt+n | St] - B*] + ( E[output gapt | St ] + . E [ zt | St]  (2) 
where rtlr is the long-run equilibrium nominal interest rates, Bt+n is inflation between period t+n 
and period t, and z is another variable (or vector of variables) that may influence the reaction of 
the central bank (i.e. the depreciation of the exchange rate, as in Clarida et al. 1998).14   
Combining (1) and (2) and rearranging: 
  rt=(1-D)[" + $ Bt+n + ( output gapt + . zt] +Drt-1 +gt   (3) 
where " = [ rtlr -$B*], and 
gt=-(1-D)[ $ (Bt+n-E[Bt+n | St])+ ( (output gapt-E[output gapt | St ]) + (zt- E [ zt | St]) + Lt. 
 Let ut be a vector of variables included in the central banks information set at the time it 
sets the interest rate that are orthogonal to g.  In other words: 
                                                 
11 Bank of Korea (2003), p.33. 
12 Here I follow the approach of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). 
13 I discuss and defend this assumption of interest-rate smoothing below. 
14 In this application we assume that the central bank cares about the current output gap but learns its value with a 
one-month lag, which seems realistic.  It would, however, be possible to relax this assumption, as noted by Clarida 
et al. (1998). 
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     E[gt | ut]=0     (4) 
Equation (4) provides the orthogonality conditions (the moments) that we exploit in order to 
estimate the unknown parameters via GMM.  In particular, the inflation forecast for period t+12 
is constructed using the values of instrumental variables available through time t.  In practice, we 
use lags 1, 2 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 12 of the overnight call rate, the index of industrial production, the 
inflation rate and the lagged rate of real exchange rate depreciation as the elements of the central 
banks information set.15 
 The sample period for this exercise is January 1998-May 2003.  Although we have 
additional observations through May 2004, these are needed in order to calculate forward 
inflation.16  Since a lagged dependent variable is included on the right hand side of equation (3), 
the estimates are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.17 
 A key step in this exercise (for the Bank of Korea as for the econometrician) is to 
estimate the output gap.  Here the time series for industrial production is transformed into an 
output gap series in two ways: a) using the two-sided linear Hodrick-Prescott filter; and b) 
assuming a linear trend.  
The results in Table 1 fit actual movements in the call rate well.18  The first two equations 
show that the call rate rises with inflation, although as aggressively as suggested by Taylors rule 
(with a coefficient greater than one) only when the gap is constructed assuming a linear trend as 
                                                 
15 Lags longer than 12 months added little in terms of forecast accuracy.  Similarly, eliminating lags 7, 8, 10, and 11 
sacrificed little and reduced the extent of multicolinearity in estimation.  Note that the rate of real exchange rate 
depreciation in the current month is not included in the posited information set because it is not uncorrelated with 
the current interest rate shock gt,, the exchange rate being a jump variable that can presumably move 
instantaneously in response to the shock.  
16 Given the 12 lags in the information set. 
17 The first step in the algorithm is to estimate the coefficients by OLS in order to compute an initial estimate of the 
parameters for use in computing the optimal weighting matrix.  The second step uses the Davidson-Fletcher-Powell 
algorithm to find the line search in subsequent iterations. 
18 The goodness of fit is of course heavily driven by the lagged dependent variable.  I return to this below.  Note that 
the dependent variable in these estimates is the actual call rate as opposed to the call rate target (see Figure 1 for 
information on their relative movement). 
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in the original Taylor (1993) article.  The call rate also rises as actual output rises relative to 
capacity (which is how the output gap is operationalized here).  The lagged dependent variable is 
significant and large, consistent with the considerable degree of smoothing evident in the Bank 
of Koreas setting of the call rate.  Note that the same large coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable has been obtained previously in studies of other countries.  Thus, for example, Clarida et 
al. (1998) obtain estimates in the interval 0.90-0.97 for the United States, 0.91-0.93 for the Bank 
of Japan, and 0.91 for the Bundesbank.19  This suggests that the interest-rate smoothing behavior 
evident in the Korean data is not peculiar to that country, although a number of the explanations 
that have been offered previously in the literature for why central banks smooth interest rates  
fear of disruption of financial markets (Goodfriend 1991), for example  seem especially 
relevant to the Korean case.  It is worth noting that differences between the predicted and actual 
values of the call rate are particularly large following the beginning of the Daewoo problem, 
which is consistent with the notion that the Bank of Korea smoothes interest rates with a view 
toward financial stability.   
Also note that despite the considerable explanatory power of the lagged dependent 
variable the coefficients on the inflation and output-gap variables are well determined (they have 
respectable t statistics).  Although the presence of the lagged dependent variable explains the 
success of these equations in tracking trends in the call rate, the other variables still appear have 
a role in explaining fluctuations around that trend.   
The key result for present purposes is that the rate of change in the real exchange rate in 
the immediate past month also appears to influence the setting of the policy instrument in 
                                                 
19 In principle, the standard errors on these other independent variables should not be understated as a result of a 
combination of a lagged dependent variable and positive autocorrelation, since the results here adjust for 
autocorrelation. 
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practice.20  Note that the real exchange rate is measured as the bilateral rate vis-à-vis the dollar, 
since it is the dollar rate to which the Bank of Korea refers in its publications.21  When the real 
rate depreciates, there is a tendency for the Bank of Korea to raise the call rate, other things equal 
(Figures 3 and 4).  Adding the rate of currency depreciation reduces the magnitude of the other 
coefficients slightly but does not otherwise change the results.22  Because the first lag of (the 
percentage change in) the real exchange rate is also included in the information set used to 
forecast inflation, the interpretation of this coefficient is that the Bank of Korea cares about the 
movement of the real exchange rate above and beyond its use in forecasting future inflation. 
Some of these results are sensitive to alternative ways of estimating the output gap.  
When no extra (z) variable is included, the coefficient on inflation is larger than the coefficient 
on the gap when the latter is constructed using a linear trend, but the inflation coefficient is 
smaller than the gap coefficient when the latter is calculated used the HP filter.  It is not clear 
which approach to estimating the output gap is more reliable in this context.  The linear-trend 
approach will be particularly sensitive to structural breaks in the data, which are likely to be 
evident in an economy like Korea that has been passing through rapid structural change since the 
crisis, while the sharp fall in output at the beginning of the sample period may tend to bias 
downward estimates of potential output obtained from the HP filter due to the end-point 
problem.  Note, however, that the key result for present purposes  how the rate of change in the 
exchange rate affects the call rate  is not sensitive to how output is detrended. 
 A number of other sensitivity analyses lent support to the robustness of these results.  The 
two that did not where when actual inflation was substituted for expected inflation, and when the 
                                                 
20 Note that similar results have been obtained for other open economies, e.g. for a number of Latin American 
countries by Corbo (2000). 
21 See below. 
22 The one change is that the coefficient on forward inflation just misses being statistically significant at the 90 per 
cent confidence level.   
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sample was limited to the second half of the post-crisis period.  Substituting backward-looking 
behavior for forward-looking behavior produces a negative coefficient on the excess of actual 
output over capacity output, contrary to what one would expect (see Table 2).  The difference in 
the two sets of estimates is thus consistent with the assumption that the Bank of Korea looks 
forward when contemplating the evolution of inflation and makes reasonably efficient use of the 
available information.  Table 2 also provides support to the observation that estimates of 
monetary policy reaction functions framed in terms of backward-looking price movements can 
be seriously misleading.   
Second, limiting the sample to the second half of the post-crisis period produces less 
precise estimates.  This is not surprising, in that this leaves relatively few monthly observations 
and even fewer changes in the call rate, and given the fact that many of the changes in the call 
rate are concentrated toward the beginning of the period. 
 The bottom line is that in practice the Bank of Korea does not disregard fluctuations in 
the won exchange rate when operationalizing monetary policy.  The rhetoric of inflation 
targeting and lack of reference to the exchange rate in its reports on monetary policy 
notwithstanding, it seems to take exchange rate fluctuations seriously when setting its operating 
target.  This appears to be true even when the behavior of the exchange rate is included in the 
information set used to forecast inflation.  This seems to indicate that exchange rate fluctuations 
matter not just for expected inflation but also for other variables of concern to the central bank, 
such as the relative condition of the traded and nontraded goods sectors, the stability of the 
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financial system, and the overall development of the Korean economy, which has traditionally 
been linked to the level of the exchange rate through the mechanism of export-led growth.23   
 The conclusion I draw is that the exchange rate matters for the conduct of monetary 
policy in Korea, rhetoric of free floating or not.  It matters not merely in that it is useful for 
forecasting inflation, but in its own right, insofar as it is directly linked to the evolution of other 
variables also of concern to the central bank. 
 
3.  What this Implies About the Transparency of Korean Monetary Policy 
 The fact that the Bank of Korea says little about the exchange rate and its influence on 
policy decisions in its annual report to the National Assembly and in its monthly statements on 
monetary policy, issued following policy decisions, raises questions about whether central bank 
policy in Korea is as transparent in theory as it is in practice.  If the central bank says one thing 
but does another (or, in the case of the exchange rate, it says nothing but does something), 
current practices may neither be an efficient way of communicating with the markets nor be an 
effective mechanism for holding the independent monetary authorities accountable for their 
decisions.   
 This is less of a problem for the annual report on monetary policy than for the monthly 
statements of the Monetary Policy Committee.  Insofar as the annual report to the National 
Assembly is intended as a mechanism of accountability, it makes sense that this should focus on 
the ultimate goals of policy  an acceptable average level of inflation and an acceptable tradeoff 
between inflation variability and short-term movements in the output gap  and that it should 
devote limited attention to the exchange rate per se.  The Bank of Korea should be held 
                                                 
23 Or perhaps the Bank of Korea cares about the opinions of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which in turn 
has strong views about the level of the exchange rate that is appropriate for the growth of exports and the stability of 
the financial sector, and which is officially responsible for determining Korean exchange rate policy. 
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accountable for its success in achieving its ultimate goals and crafting a socially-acceptable 
balance between them.  The National Assembly should have something to say, and it may want 
to do something as well, if it sees the central bank too single mindedly attempting to minimize 
the variance of inflation while placing too little weight on short-term movements in the output 
gap, or equally if it sees the central bank as doing the converse.  Movements in the exchange rate 
are not obviously of first-order importance for the balance between these variables (as distinct 
from affecting each of them).  It is hard to imagine members of the National Assembly, or other 
observers, saying Because we think you should be placing more weight on the output gap as 
opposed to minimizing the variance of inflation, we think you should be placing more weight on 
the exchange rate in your decisions, for it is far from clear whether the exchange rate affects the 
prospects for inflation or the output gap more strongly.  Indeed, the precise answer may depend 
on circumstances.  From this point of view, that the Banks annual report to the National 
Assembly focuses on inflation, financial stability and the real economy rather, while saying little 
about the exchange rate per se, does not seem inappropriate.24 
 The monthly statements of the Monetary Policy Committee are another matter.  These are 
a mechanism for communicating the intentions of the monetary authorities to the public and the 
market on a month-to-month basis.  They are part of the basis on which the public and the 
market take their consumption and investment decisions.  Typically, these statements make no 
mention of the exchange rate.  If in fact the central bank is responding to movements in the 
                                                 
24 Faust and Henderson (2004) suggest a different problem with documents like the Bank of Koreas report to the 
National Assembly.  In practice these focus almost entirely on the central banks success in achieving an acceptable 
average rate of inflation, and do not analyze the policy tradeoff between greater inflation variance on the one hand 
and smaller variance of the output gap on the other.  Like the Bank of Korea, they describe the optimization process 
in terms of a target for one variable (inflation) and adjusting the time horizon (moving from the short-run target to a 
medium-term target) to take into account the other (movements in the output gap).  As Faust and Hednerson (p.15) 
put it, this description fundamentally obfuscates a trade-off that essentially involves using one instrument 
(monetary policy) to get close to a weighted average of two targets (the mean of inflation and the balance between 
the variability of inflation and the variability of the gap).  
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exchange rate but it is not acknowledging this fact, private consumption and investment 
decisions may be taken erroneously, or at least they will be unnecessarily affected by 
uncertainty.25  Best-practice open-economy inflation targeting suggests that MPCs monthly 
statements should contain more discussion of the exchange rate if this in fact is part of the basis 
for the committees rate-setting decisions.  This is especially important for a country with a 
highly competitive media, like Korea, where there is an incentive for journalists to engage in 
hyperbole in order to sell papers.  In this case it will then be particularly important for the central 
bank to provide market participants with the relevant information directly, rather than leaving it 
to the press to characterize the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy formulation.  
 
4.  Which Exchange Rate? 
 Traditionally, these questions of how events in other countries affect Korean growth and 
inflation have been formulated in terms of the U.S., European and Japanese markets.  When 
those markets are buoyant, the output gap narrows in Korea and inflationary pressure intensifies.  
There is then an argument for tightening monetary policy and letting the exchange rate 
strengthen.  The new development on this scene is, of course, China.  Where China accounted for 
less than one per cent of South Koreas exports as recently as 1990, it now accounts for roughly 
                                                 
25 Poole (2001, p.4) puts it too strongly when he asserts that there is no finding in the macroeconomic literature 
providing a theoretical case, or empirical support, for the view that confusion or uncertainty in the private sector 
about the direction of monetary policy serves to better achieve policy objectives.  In fact, there is a fairly 
substantial theoretical literature (surveyed by Geraats 2002) analyzing circumstances in which less transparency 
and/or more uncertainty about central bank policy may be welfare improving.  Most of these special cases are 
elaborations of the theory of the second best, where an additional distortion (adding noise to the public signal about 
the intentions of monetary policy makers) is welfare enhancing because there exist other distortions working in the 
opposite direction.  Most of these examples are, in my view, rather special cases with little practical relevance for 
policy.  The most compelling such example assumes strategic interaction among private agents and that the public 
signal about future economic developments is noisier than the private signal.  In this situation, providing a bit more 
public information through an increase in transparency causes private agents, concerned to coordinate their actions, 
to place more weight on the noisy public signal, resulting in a deterioration rather than an improvement in resource 
allocation.   In practice, studies like Memertzis and Hughes Hallett (2003) provide little empirical support for these 
perverse cases. 
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a fifth.  (See Table 3.)  This implies that the Bank of Korea should monitor developments in 
China as intensively as it monitors developments in the United States and other advanced 
industrial countries.  This is an argument for the Bank of Korea moving away from its dollar 
focus in its policy statements and its call-rate policy.  In particular, as Chinese economic growth 
decelerates in response to the monetary tightening implemented there in response to fears of 
overheating, there may similarly be an incentive for the Bank of Korea to loosen and allow the 
won to depreciate as necessary. 
 But Chinese trade in general and Chinese trade with Korea in particular differ from the 
trade of other countries in the magnitude of the countrys imports of parts and components used 
as inputs into its exports of manufactures to third markets.  China is an export platform for 
countries like Korea, assembling consumer electronics and other goods for sale in the U.S., 
Europe and Japan, using Korean machinery, parts and expertise.  Thus, a deceleration in Chinese 
growth (like that which we are apparently witnessing at the moment) has two offsetting effects 
on Korea.  On the one hand, it slows the growth of Chinas demand for Korean exports of 
components and capital goods.  On the other hand, it slows the growth of Chinas exports of 
manufactures to third markets, creating additional space there for Koreas own exports.  It is not 
clear in the abstract which effect dominates.  If the second effect dominates, then a soft or hard 
landing in China might in fact intensify inflationary pressure and narrow the output gap in Korea, 
providing grounds for tightening monetary policy and allowing the won to appreciate, rather than 
the other way around. 
 In Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004), my coauthors and I estimate the impact of 
Chinese growth on Chinas demand for imports from its Asian neighbors, together with the 
impact of Chinas growth on that countrys exports to third markets, and the propensity for 
 16
Chinese exports to crowd out the exports of other Asian countries to those same third markets.26  
We use trade data disaggregated into exports of capital goods, intermediates, and consumer 
goods.  A summary of the results is in Table 4.  These show that the Chinese and Korean 
economies tend to move together.  Thus, when China slows down, Korea slows down as well, 
due mainly to the impact on Korean exports of capital goods to the Chinese mainland.  This 
suggests that the Bank of Korea should react to movements in the Chinese yuan in much the 
same manner that it reacts to movements in the dollar, the yen and the euro. 
 Note, however, that while the same result obtains for Japan and Singapore, the two other 
advanced economies in the region that are also heavy exporters of capital goods to China, it does 
not obtain for middle-income Asian countries such as, inter alia, Malaysia and Thailand (and it 
certainly does not obtain for low-income Asian countries).  This is a reminder that the same 
formula for monetary and exchange rate policy that is appropriate for Korea is not appropriate 
for all Asian economies. 
 
5.  The Role of the Exchange Rate and Economic and Financial Development 
 At the most basic level, the choice of exchange rate regime  equivalently, the weight 
placed on changes in the exchange rate in the central banks reaction function  should be a 
function of a countrys economic development strategy.  Korea has long been committed to a 
strategy of export-led growth, in which it keeps the exchange rate of the won stable at 
competitive levels.  The traded-goods sector has traditionally been seen as a locus of learning by 
doing and productivity spillovers.  Thus, keeping the exchange rate from appreciating in order to 
stimulate capacity expansion and investment in this sector, while at the same time keeping 
                                                 
26 The key methodological insight in this exercise is the recognition that Chinese exports are endogenous, and the 
use of the standard arguments of the gravity model, such as the distance from China to each extra-Asian export 
market, as an instrument for this variable. 
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interest rates low and utilizing government influence over the financial system to channel 
resources for capital formation in its direction, was the Korean strategy for stimulating 
productivity and economic growth.  The positive results of this strategy create understandable 
worries that greater exchange rate flexibility might jeopardize the success of Koreas growth 
model.  This explains, in the conventional view, why the Ministry of Finance and Economy has 
opposed an overly strong exchange rate and the Bank of Korea has accumulated such massive 
dollar reserves. 
 The rebuttal to this view is that the model of export-led growth has outlived its 
usefulness.  To be sure, exports of manufactures still matter for Korea, as they do for the United 
States and every other advanced economy.  But they are no longer disproportionately the locus of 
learning effects and productivity spillovers.  Recent studies of the U.S. (e.g. Gordon 2002) have 
documented that the sector with far and away the fastest growing productivity growth rates is 
retailing: companies like Walmart have succeeded in using information and communications 
technologies to rationalize inventory control and otherwise streamline their operations in ways 
that have resulted in massive increases in productivity.  While U.S. companies have also sought 
to export this technology, this is basically productivity advance led by the nontraded goods 
sector.  A set of economic policies that encourages companies to concentrate on the production 
of exportable manufactures at the expense of nontradables production may pass up the most 
attractive opportunities for boosting productivity. 
 To the extent that growth in the 21st century will depend on a countrys ability to train  
and retain  knowledge workers, the argument for policies that encourage a better balance 
between traded- and nontraded-goods production becomes stronger still.  Education is the 
obvious activity to be fostered in order to train knowledge workers, and education is a classic 
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nontraded good (although those of us who teach at the University of California, observing the 
composition of our student body, may question whether such services are really nontraded).  
Retaining knowledge workers  and, even better, attracting them from abroad  requires 
investing in housing and urban amenities, which are similarly nontraded goods.  All this suggests 
that a growth model tailored to the imperatives of the 21st century requires a better balance of 
investment in sectors supplying traded and nontraded goods. 
 Finally, a strategy of keeping the exchange rate from appreciating and keeping interest 
rates low in order to channel additional resources into the production of exports  or more 
generally into the production of those goods in which the scope for productivity improvement is 
greatest  works less well in a deregulated financial environment.  Recent experience shows that 
countries that have imported low U.S. interest rates as a result of keeping their currencies stable 
against the dollar have seen resources flow not into increases in industrial capacity but into 
speculative investments in commercial and residential real estate.  In a substantially deregulated 
financial environment, the government has little ability to prevent this.  Construction booms can 
lead to an inferior allocation of resources with very long-lived effects (Field 1992).  A 
concentration of speculative construction loans on bank balance sheets can pose a threat to 
financial stability.  Even China, where the banking system remains substantially under the 
control of the authorities, displayed these symptoms in 2003, when the combination of a pegged 
exchange rate and substantial capital inflows led to signs of property-market overheating.  
Because Chinas banks still take instructions from the authorities, the latter can address the 
problem simply by directing the banks to stop lending.27  For countries with more completely 
                                                 
27 Although there is still some scope for capital to flow into the property market through nonbank channels, as 
described in Eichengreen (2004). 
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deregulated financial systems and open capital accounts, the only solution to this problem is a 
more flexible exchange rate. 
 The other reason besides their long-standing commitment to export-led growth why 
Korean policy makers may be reluctant to move to greater exchange rate flexibility is the worry 
that exchange rate stability is important for financial development  and for the development of 
bond markets in particular.  The currency risk associated with volatile exchange rates may deter 
both local and foreign investors from holding long-term, domestic-currency-denominated debt 
securities.  Hence there may be a conflict between allowing greater exchange rate variability and 
encouraging local bond markets, something that Korean policy makers see as integral to building 
a more robust and better developed financial sector. 
 Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) report some evidence that countries with 
more volatile exchange rates do in fact have smaller bond markets, holding constant a number of 
other potential determinants of bond market development.  However, this result is driven by a 
few cases where exchange rates are highly volatile and unpredictable.  In the range of more 
modest exchange-rate volatility relevant to Korea, there is little evidence that greater exchange 
rate variability is a significant impediment to bond market development.  Part of the explanation 
may lie in the development of derivatives markets and structured instruments with which it is 
possible to hedge exchange rate risk (see e.g. Fernandez and Klassen 2004).  
 
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 Koreas experience with inflation targeting since implementation of the revised central 
bank act in 1998 and the shift away from targeting monetary aggregates after 2000 has been 
 20
broadly satisfactory.  The authorities have succeeded in maintaining a relatively stable and 
moderate rate of inflation.  The technical problems warned of by skeptics of the application of 
inflation targeting to Korea and other Asian countries (viz. lack of timely data, difficulty of 
forecasting inflation) have not interfered with the operation of this regime.28  Nor have 
inadequate financial depth and development seriously disrupted its operation.  There is some 
evidence (for example, in the large deviation between the policy interest rates predicted by the 
Taylor rule and those actually maintained by the Bank of Korea around the time of the Daewoo 
crisis) that financial fragility has figured in the conduct of inflation targeting in Korea.  I return 
to this point momentarily.  But, be this as it may, the authorities concern for financial stability 
has not conflicted in alarming ways with their pursuit of the key objective of inflation targeting, 
namely, a low and relatively stable inflation rate, any more than, say, in the case of the Federal 
Reserve and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. 
What has been the role of the exchange rate in this regime?  The balance of evidence 
suggests that the won is now fluctuating more freely than under the old (pre-crisis) regime.  By 
and large these fluctuations have stabilizing from a macroeconomic point of view: the won has 
strengthened in periods when the expansion of the Korean economy was accelerating and 
weakened when the expansion appeared to be losing steam.  While the exchange rate does not 
receive much attention in the Bank of Koreas Monetary Policy Report to the National Assembly 
or its monthly press releases following decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee, there is still 
the sense that the authorities are vigilant about its fluctuation  that they continue to care about 
how movements in the exchange rate affect their ultimate policy goals, and that they adjust 
policy accordingly.  Movements in the real exchange rate will naturally matter in a small open 
economy, where they have important implications for the future course of inflation.  But my 
                                                 
28 For an ex ante review of these potential problems see Ho and Wong (2001). 
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findings suggest that the Bank of Korea does not only care about the real exchange rate because 
the latter contains information relevant for its inflation forecast.  In addition, it responds to 
movements in the real exchange rate for other reasons as well, reasons like the balance of 
investment in traded and nontraded goods sectors, or the implications for financial stability. 
 My analysis is consistent with the notion that this is a sensible monetary regime for the 
country.  The exchange rate is not a suitable anchor for monetary policy in an economy as large, 
diversified and financially open as Korea.  Inflation targeting provides a sounder basis for the 
formulation and conduct of monetary policy in such a country.  At the same time, a central bank 
like Koreas cannot regard fluctuations in the exchange rate with an attitude of benign neglect.  
Movements in the exchange rate matter too much for future inflation, for the evolution of the 
output gap, for the stability of the financial system, and for the development of the economy 
generally.  Inflation targeting in an open economy like Korea does not imply disregard of the 
exchange rate.  Indeed, the opposite is true.  Moreover, the central bank of a country like Korea 
whose real and financial sectors are sensitive to movements in the real exchange rate is unlikely 
to limit its attention to the exchange rate to its implications for the future evolution of inflation. 
 My recommendations are thus not for radical changes in Korean monetary policy, but for 
more clarity on the role of the exchange rate in its formulation and conduct.  If the members of 
the Monetary Policy Committee are in fact attentive to exchange rate movements when adjusting 
the call rate, which is what is suggested by the evidence presented here, and especially if they 
care about such movements for reasons not limited to the utility of that variable for forecasting 
future inflation, then they should acknowledge this in their monthly press releases 
communicating the rationale for their decisions to the public and the markets.  Avoiding the issue 
sows confusion among consumers and investors, which is not helpful for policy.  More 
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specifically, discussing the exchange rate purely in terms of its information content for future 
inflation is not transparent and consistent when the central bank apparently cares about the 
exchange rate for other reasons as well.  And framing discussions of exchange rate trends purely 
in terms of dollar/won fluctuations is not illuminating at a time when Koreas trade is 
geographically diversified and other exchange rates matter increasingly for the conduct of 
monetary policy.  Finally, the most important new event affecting the prospects for Korean 
inflation and growth, Chinas emergence, still figures not at all in the publications and statements 
of Korean monetary policy makers.  More attention to developments in China and more 
discussion of how these shape the formulation of policy will be essential to the effective 
communication of policy intentions going forward -- especially since the implications for Korea 
are far from straightforward. 
 Many of the trends reviewed in this paper suggest that the Bank of Korea should now 
place less weight on the exchange rate, the dollar exchange rate in particular, in the formulation 
of policy, on the grounds that movements in that rate are becoming less closely tied to the 
ultimate objectives of monetary policy.  As Korea exits the stage of export-led growth for 
innovation- and knowledge-intensive economic growth, it needs a better balance of investment in 
traded- and non-traded goods sectors.  Keeping the exchange rate from appreciating will no 
longer be the obvious tonic for growth.  As the yuan begins to move more freely against the 
dollar, as will happen sooner or later, no one exchange rate will any longer be an appropriate 
focus for export competitiveness.  As domestic financial markets develop and prudential 
supervision and regulation continue to be strengthened, corporate finances will no longer be as 
sensitive to exchange rate movements, enabling the authorities to allow the currency to fluctuate 
more without threatening financial stability.  By how much the exchange rate should then move 
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will depend on circumstances; it will depend on the specific constellation of domestic and 
foreign shocks to which the Korean economy is subjected.  We should not automatically expect 
to see wider exchange rate movements in 2004-2010 than in 1998-2004.  But the considerations 
raised here do suggest that the Bank of Korea should place less weight on those movements than 
it has in the last six years.  
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Table 1 
GMM Estimates: Forward-Looking Inflation 
(adjusted standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Equation 
Alpha 
(constant) 
Beta 
(Inflation) 
Gamma 
(Gap) 
Rho 
(LDV) 
Zeta 
(Real depr.) 
Gap 
computed 
by 
1.086 0.772 1.103 0.956 1 
0.881 0.288 0.139 0.004 -- 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
-0.716 1.384 0.412 0.944 2 
0.696 0.223 0.038 0.004 -- 
Linear 
trend 
2.493 0.370 0.129 0.937 0.123 3 
0.672 0.228 0.099 0.005 0.010 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
-0.073 1.169 0.409 0.933 0.054 4 
0.713 0.237 0.029 0.005 0.009 
Linear 
trend 
Note: The rate of real exchange rate depreciation is lagged one month.  The instruments are a 
constant and lags 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12 of the overnight call rate, industrial production index, 
real exchange rate depreciation and inflation.  
 
Source: see text. 
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Table 2 
GMM Estimates: Backward-Looking Inflation 
(adjusted standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Equation 
Alpha 
(Constant) 
Beta 
(Inflation) 
Gamma 
(Gap) 
Rho 
(LDP) 
Zeta 
(Real depr.) 
Gap 
computed 
by 
-0.523 1.259 1.555 0.947 1 
0.555 0.138 0.175 0.005 -- 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
1.820 0.505 0.574 0.925 2 
0.295 0.071 0.055 0.004 -- 
Linear 
trend 
4.347 -0.318 1.034 0.939 0.133 3 
0.442 0.137 0.115 0.004 0.018 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
4.613 -0.453 0.422 0.910 0.128 4 
0.242 0.079 0.042 0.004 0.012 
Linear 
trend 
Note: The rate of real exchange rate depreciation is lagged one month.  The instruments are a 
constant and lags 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12 of the overnight call rate, industrial production index, 
real exchange rate depreciation and inflation.  
 
Source: see text. 
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Table 3. The Percentage of Exports to China in 
Total Exports 
 1990 1997 2002 
Japan 2.47 6.38 11.69 
Bangladesh 1.26 1.04 0.51 
Cambodia 0.39 7.48 1.28 
Sri Lanka 0.08 0.21 0.24 
India 0.47 2.19 4.25 
Indonesia 3.14 4.74 6.96 
Korea 0.39 11.73 16.42 
Malaysia 2.49 2.65 8.01 
Pakistan 1.54 4.54 5.51 
Philippines 0.94 1.11 6.90 
Singapore 1.96 4.60 7.28 
Thailand 1.62 3.25 7.46 
Vietnam 0.06 3.80 6.61 
  
 
Source: Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004). 
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Table 4. Net Impact on Neighbors Exports of Chinas Income 
Growth 
 
 
Capital 
Goods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Inter- 
mediates 
Total 
 
Japan 0.18 -0.24 0.05 0.03 
Bangladesh 0.00 -0.32 0.05 -0.28 
Cambodia 0.01 -0.32 0.09 -0.24 
Sri Lanka 0.03 -0.32 0.00 -0.25 
India 0.02 -0.30 0.06 -0.12 
Indonesia 0.14 -0.30 0.08 -0.04 
Korea 0.23 -0.19 0.12 0.06 
Malaysia 0.11 -0.30 0.04 -0.01 
Pakistan 0.06 -0.25 0.07 -0.21 
Philippine 0.11 -0.30 0.05 -0.01 
Singapore 0.11 -0.28 0.00 0.03 
Thailand 0.11 -0.29 0.08 -0.07 
Vietnam 0.04 -0.30 0.14 -0.14 
 
Source: Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong (2004). 
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